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We apply techniques from the field of computational mechanics to evaluate the statistical complexity of neural
recording data in fruit flies. We connect statistical complexity to the flies’ level of conscious arousal, which is
manipulated by general anaesthesia (isoflurane). We show that the complexity of even single channel time series
data decreases under anaesthesia. The observed difference in complexity between the two states of conscious
arousal increases as higher orders of temporal correlations are taken into account. In contrast to prior work,
our results show that complexity differences can emerge at very short time scales and across broad regions of
the fly brain without the need to saturate Markov order, thus heralding the macroscopic state of anaesthesia in
a previously unforeseen manner. Furthering the links between physics, complexity science and neuroscience
promotes the understanding of the physical basis that supports the level of conscious arousal in biological
organisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex phenomena are everywhere in the physical world.
Typically, these emerge from simple interactions among ele-
ments in a network, such as atoms making up molecules or
organisms in a society. Despite their diversity, it is possible
to approach these subjects with a common set of tools, using
numerical and statistical techniques to relate microscopic de-
tails to emergent macroscopic properties [1]. There has long
been a trend of applying these tools to the brain, the archety-
pal complex system, and much of neuroscience is concerned
with relating electrical activity in networks of neurons to psy-
chological and cognitive phenomena [2]. In particular, there
is a growing body of experimental evidence [3], that neural
firing patterns can be strongly related to the level of conscious
arousal in animals.
In humans, level of consciousness varies from very low
in coma and under deep general anaesthesia, to very high
in fully wakeful states of conscious arousal [4]. With the
current technology, precise discrimination between uncon-
scious vegetative states and minimally conscious states are
particularly challenging and remains a clinical challenge [5].
Therefore, substantial improvement in accuracy of determin-
ing such conscious states using neural recording data will
have significant societal impacts. Towards such a goal, neural
data has been analysed using various techniques and notions
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of complexity to try to find the most reliable measure of con-
sciousness [6, 7].
One of the most successful techniques to date in distin-
guishing levels of conscious arousal is the perturbational
complexity index [8–10], which measures the neural activity
patterns that follows a perturbation of the brain through mag-
netic stimulation. The evoked patterns are processed through
a pipeline then finally summarised using Lempel-Ziv com-
plexity [9]. This method is inspired by a theory of conscious-
ness, called integrated information theory (IIT) [11, 12],
which proposes that a high level of conscious arousal should
be correlated with the amount of so-called integrated infor-
mation, or the degree of differentiated integration in a neu-
ral system (see Ref. [13] for details). While there are vari-
ous ways to capture this essential concept [14, 15], one way
to interpret integrated information is as the amount of loss
of information a system has on its own future or past states
based on its current state, when the system is minimally dis-
connected [16–18].
These complexity measures, inspired by IIT, are motivated
by the fundamental properties of conscious phenomenology,
such as informativeness and integratedness of any experience
[11]. While there are ongoing efforts to accurately translate
these phenomenological properties into mathematical postu-
lates [13], such translation often contains assumptions about
the underlying process which are not necessarily borne out
in reality. For example, the derived mathematical postulates
in IIT assume Markovian dynamics, i.e., that the future evo-
lution of a neural system is determined statistically by its
present state [15]. Moreover, IIT requires computing the cor-
relations across all possible divisions between subsystems,
which makes it computationally very hard. Given the hier-
archical causal influences in the brain, manifesting as oscil-
lations across a range of frequencies and spatial regions [19],
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2non-Markovian temporal correlations likely play a significant
role in explaining any experimentally measurable behaviours,
potentially including the level of conscious arousal. There is
therefore, scope for applying more general notions of com-
plexity to meaningfully distinguish macroscopic brain states
that support consciousness.
A conceptually simple approach to quantifying the com-
plexity of time series data, such as the fluctuating potential
in a neuron, is to construct the minimal model which statisti-
cally reproduces it. Remarkably, this minimal model, known
as an epsilon machine (-machine), can be found via a sys-
tematic procedure which has been developed within the field
of computational mechanics [20–22]. Crucially, -machines
account for multiple temporal correlations contained in the
data and can be used to quantify the statistical complexity of
a process – the minimal amount of information required to
specify its state. As such they have been applied over vari-
ous fields, ranging from neuroscience [23, 24] and psychol-
ogy [25] to crystallography [26] and ecology [27], to the stock
market [28]. Lastly, unlike IIT the -machine analysis can be
performed for data coming from a single channel.
In this paper, we use the statistical complexity derived from
an -machine analysis of neural activity to distinguish states
of conscious arousal in fruit flies (D. melanogaster) as mea-
sured in the presence or absence of general anaesthetics. We
analyse neural data collected from flies under different con-
centrations of isoflurane [29, 30]. By analysing signals from
individual electrodes and disregarding spatial correlations,
we find that statistical complexity distinguishes between the
two states of conscious arousal through temporal correlations
alone. In particular, as the degree of temporal correlations
increases, the difference in complexity between the wakeful
and anaesthetised states becomes larger.
Before presenting these results in detail in Sec. III and dis-
cussing their implications in Sec. IV, we begin in the next
section with a brief overview of the -machine framework we
will use for our analysis.
II. THEORY: -MACHINES AND STATISTICAL
COMPLEXITY
To uncover the underlying statistical structure of neural ac-
tivity that characterises a given conscious state, we treat the
measured neural data, given by voltage fluctuations in time,
as discrete time series. To analyse these time series, we use
the mathematical tools of computational mechanics, which
we outline in this section. We start a general discussion on
the ways to use time series data to infer a model of a system
while placing -machines in this context. Next, we explain
how we construct -machines in practice. Finally, we show
how this can be used to extract a meaningful notion of statis-
tical complexity of a process.
A. From time series to -Machines
In abstract terms, a discrete-time series is a sequence of
symbols r = (r0, . . . , rk, . . .) that appear over time, one af-
ter the other [31]. Each element of r corresponds to a sym-
bol from a finite alphabet A observed at the discrete time
step labelled by the subscript k. The occurrence of a sym-
bol, at a given time step, is random in general and thus the
process, which produces the time series, is stochastic [32].
However, the symbols may not appear in a completely in-
dependent manner, i.e., the probability of seeing a particular
symbol may strongly depend on symbols observed in the past.
These temporal correlations are often referred to as memory,
and they play an important role in constructing models that
are able to predict the future behaviour of a given stochastic
process [33].
Relative to an arbitrary time k, let us denote the future and
the past partitions of the complete sequence as r = ( ~r, ~r),
where the past and the future are ~r = (. . . , rk−2, rk−1) and
~r = (rk, rk+1, . . .) respectively. In general, for the prediction
of the immediate future symbol rk, knowledge of the past
` symbols ~r` := (rk−`, . . . , rk−2, rk−1), may be necessary.
The number of past symbols we need to account for in order
to optimally predict the future sequence is called the Markov
order [34].
In general, the difficulty of modelling a time series in-
creases exponentially with its Markov order. However, not
all distinct pasts lead to unique future probability distribu-
tions, leaving room for compression in the model. In a sem-
inal work, Crutchfield and Young showed the existence of a
class of models, which they called -machines, that are prov-
ably the optimal predictive models for a non-Markovian pro-
cess under the assumption of statistical stationarity [20, 21].
Constructing the -machine is achieved by partitioning sets
of partial past observations ~r` into causal states. That is, two
distinct sequences of partial past observations ~r` and ~r
′
` be-
long to the same causal state Si ∈ S, if the probability of
observing a specific ~r given ~r` or ~r
′
` is the same; that is
~r` ∼ ~r′` if P (~r | ~r`) = P (~r | ~r′`), (1)
where ∼ indicates that two histories correspond to the same
causal state. The conditional probability distributions in
Eq. (1) may always be estimated from a finite set of (sta-
tistically stationary) data via the naive maximum likelihood
estimate, given by P (rk| ~r`) = ν(rk, ~r`)/ν( ~r`), where ν(X)
is the frequency of occurrence of sub-sequence X in the data.
We now discuss how to practically construct an -machine for
a given time series.
B. Constructing -machines with the CSSR algorithm
Several algorithms have been developed to construct
-machines from time series data [20, 35, 36]. Here, we
briefly explain the Causal State Splitting Reconstruction
(CSSR) algorithm [25], which we use in this work to infer
-machines predicting the statistics of neural data we provide
as input.
The CSSR algorithm proceeds to iteratively construct
sets of causal states accounting for longer and longer sub-
sequences of symbols. In each iteration, the algorithm first es-
timates the probabilities P (rk| ~r`) of observing a symbol con-
ditional on each length ` prior sequence and compares them
3with the distribution P (rk|S = Si) it would expect from
the causal states it has so far reconstructed. If P (rk| ~r`) =
P (rk|S = Si) for some causal state, then ~r` is identified with
it. If the probability is found to be different for all existing Si,
then a new causal state is created to accommodate the sub-
sequence. By constructing new causal states only as neces-
sary, the algorithm guarantees a minimal model that describes
the non-Markovian behaviour of the data (up to a given mem-
ory length), and hence the corresponding -machine of the
process.
The CSSR algorithm compares probability distributions
via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [37, 38]. The hypothe-
sis that P (rk| ~r`) and P (rk|S = Si) are identical up to statis-
tical fluctuations is rejected by the KS test at the significance
level σ when a distance DKS [39] is greater than tabulated
critical values of σ [40]. In other words, σ sets a limit on the
accuracy of the history grouping by parametrising the proba-
bility that an observed history ~r` belonging to a causal state
Si, is mistakenly split off and placed in a new causal state
Sj . Our analysis, in agreement with Ref. [25], found that
the choice of this value does not affect the outcome of CSSR
within the tested range of 0.001 < σ < 0.01. As a result,
we set σ = 0.005 for the entirety of this study unless stated
otherwise.
As it progresses, the CSSR algorithm compares future
probabilities for longer and longer sub-sequences, up to a
maximum past history length of λ, which is the only impor-
tant parameter that must be selected prior to running CSSR
in addition to σ. A value of λ is the largest size of mem-
ory we consider. If the considered time series is generated by
a stochastic process of Markov order `, choosing λ < ` re-
sults in poor prediction because the inferred -machine cannot
capture the long-memory structures present in the data. De-
spite this, the CSSR algorithm will still produce an -machine
that is consistent with the approximate future statistics of
the process up to order-λ correlations [25]. Given sufficient
data, choosing λ ≥ ` guarantees convergence on the true
-machine. One important caveat to note is that the time com-
plexity of the algorithm scales asymptotically asO(|A|2λ+1),
putting an upper limit to the longest history length that is
computationally feasible to use.
Furthermore, the finite length of the time series data im-
plies an upper limit on an ‘acceptable’ value of λ. Estimating
P (rk| ~rλ) requires sampling strings of length λ from the fi-
nite data sequence. Since the number of such strings grows
exponentially with λ, a value of λ that is too long relative to
the size N of the data, will result in a severely under-sampled
estimation of the distribution. A distribution P (rk| ~rλ) that
has been estimated from an under-sampled space is almost al-
ways never equal to P (rk|S = Si), resulting in the algorithm
creating a new causal state for every string of length λ it en-
counters. A bound for the largest permissible history length
is L(N) ≥ log2N/ log2 |A|, where L(N) denotes maximum
length for a given data size of N [41, 42]. Once these con-
siderations have been taken into account, the -machine pro-
duced by the algorithm provides us with a meaningful quan-
tifier of the complexity of the process generating the time se-
ries, as we now discuss.
C. Statistical complexity of a process
The output of the CSSR algorithm is the set of causal states
and rules for transitioning from one state to another. That is,
CSSR gives a Markov chain represented by a digraph [20, 34]
G(V,E) consisting of a set of vertices vi ∈ V and directed
edges {i, j} ∈ E, e.g. Figs. 1(c) and (d). Using these rules,
one can find the probabilities P (Si) to find the -machine
in each of the causal states at a randomly chosen time. The
Shannon entropy of this distribution quantifies the minimal
number of bits of information required to optimally predict
the future process; this measure, first introduced in Ref. [20],
is called the statistical complexity:
Cµ := H [S] = −
∑
i
P (Si) logP (Si). (2)
In the next section, we describe the experimental and analy-
sis methods and the results: the statistical complexity of the
neural time series for the conscious arousal states of the fly
corresponding to awake and anaesthetised conditions are sig-
nificantly different.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Methods
We analysed local field potential (LFP) data from
the brains of awake and isoflurane-anaesthetised D.
melanogaster (Canton S wild type) flies. Here, we briefly
provide the essential experimental outline that is necessary to
understand this paper. The full details of the experiment are
presented in Refs. [29, 30]. LFPs were recorded by inserting a
linear silicon probe (Neuronexus 3mm-25-177) with 16 elec-
trodes separated by 25 µm. The probe covered approximately
half of the fly brain and recorded neural activity as illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). A tungsten wire inserted into the thorax acted
as the reference. The LFPs at each electrode were recorded
for 18s while the fly was awake and 18s more after the fly
was anaesthetised (isoflurane, 0.6% by volume, through an
evaporator). Flies’ unresponsiveness during anaesthesia was
confirmed by the absence of behavioural responses to a series
of air puffs, and recovery was also confirmed after isoflurane
gas was turned off [29].
We used data sampled at 1kHz for the analysis [29], and to
obtain an estimate of local neural activity, the 16 electrodes
were re-referenced by subtracting adjacent signals giving 15
channels which we parametrise as c ∈ [1, 15]. Line noise was
removed from the recordings, followed by linear de-trending
and removing the mean. The resulting data is a fluctuating
voltage signal, which is time-binned (1ms bins) and bina-
rised by splitting over the median, leading to a time series,
see Fig. 1(b).
For each of the 13 flies in our data set, we have 30 time
series of length N = 18, 000. They correspond to the 15
channels, labelled numerically from the central to peripheral
region as depicted in Fig. 1(a), and the two states of con-
scious arousal. Using the CSSR algorithm [25], we construct
4Figure 1. Evolution of experimental data from neural signals to -machines. (a) Representative schematic of D. melanogaster brain (modified
from Ref. [43]) depicted with probe and approximate channel locations. Each channel c ∈ [1, 15] samples around a localised region in the
brain, with numerical labels ordered from the central (c = 1) to peripheral (c = 15) regions. (b) Example reading of a processed local field
potential (LFP) for a single channel. Points along the x-axis represent LFP measurements at each sampling time step. The median LFP
measurement of the sample is shown as the grey line bisecting data. LFP binarisation is determined via splitting over the median with the
encoding scheme 0 : LFP ≤ Median, and 1 : otherwise. The -machines are inferred by using the binary string as the input to the CSSR
algorithm. (c) Digraph representation of the CSSR-inferred -machine for channel 1 readings of fly 1 under anaesthesia (0.6 vol.% isoflurane)
with σ = 0.005 and λ = 3. Graph vertices correspond to causal states. Vertex labels distinguishing causal states are assigned arbitrarily and
do not imply state equivalence across multiple graphs. Directed edges correspond to transitions between causal states. Edge labels denote the
probability (2 significant figures) of a transition occurring, and edge colour encodes the emitted symbol upon making the transition (1: Red,
0: Blue). The histories stored in the causal states for this -machine are visualised in Fig. 6. (d) Digraph representation of -machine for the
wakeful (0 vol.% isoflurane) level of conscious arousal for the same channel, fly, σ, and λ as in (c). We report the statistical complexities
Canaesµ = 1.88 and Cwakeµ = 2.96 for (c) and (d) respectively.
-machines for each of these time series as a function of max-
imum memory length within the range λ ∈ [2, 11]. This is be-
low the memory length L(N) ∼ 14 beyond which we would
be unable to reliably determine transition probabilities for a
sequence of length N (see Sec. II B) [44]. We record the re-
sulting 3, 900 -machine structures and their corresponding
statistical complexities, and group them according to their re-
spective level of conscious arousal, ψ, channel location, c,
and maximum memory length, λ. Thus, statistical complex-
ity Cµ is a function of the set of parameters {ψ, c, λ} for each
fly, f . We are principally interested in the difference in statis-
tical complexity over states of conscious arousal
∆Cµ = C
wake
µ − Canaesµ (3)
for fixed values of {f, c, λ}. Positive values of ∆Cµ indicate
higher complexities observed in the wakeful state relative to
the anaesthetised one. Finally, we use the notation 〈∆Cµ〉x
to denote taking an average of ∆Cµ over parameter set x ∈
{f, c, λ}.
To assess the significance each of the parameters ψ, c, and
λ, or some combination of them, have on the response of
Cµ across flies, we conduct a statistical analysis using lin-
ear mixed effects modelling [45] (LME). The LME analysis
describes the response of statistical complexity by modelling
it as a multidimensional linear regression of the form
C = Fβ + Rb + E . (4)
The resulting model in Eq. (4) consists of a family of equa-
tions where C is the vector allowing for different responses of
Cµ for each specific fly, channel location, and level of con-
scious arousal. Memory length λ, channel location c, and
state of conscious arousal ψ, are the parameters that C re-
sponds to. To account for variations in the response caused
by interactions between parameters (e.g. between memory
length and channel location), we include them in the model.
The set of these parameters, and any combination between
them F = {λ, c, ψ, λc, λψ, cψ, λcψ}, are known as the fixed
effects of Eq. (4), and are contained as elements within the
matrix F. The vector β, contains the regression coefficients
describing the strength of each of the fixed effects F .
In addition to fixed effects affecting the response of sta-
tistical complexity in our experiment, we also take into ac-
count any variation in response caused by known, random
5effects. In particular, we expect stronger response variations
to be caused by correlations occurring between the channels
within a single fly, compared to between channels across flies.
These random effects are contained as elements of the ma-
trix R, where the vector b are the regression coefficients de-
scribing their strengths. Finally, the vector E describes the
normally-distributed unknown, random effects in the model.
The regression coefficients contained in the vectors β and b,
are obtained via maximum likelihood estimation such that E
are minimised. The explicit form of Eq. (4) used in this anal-
ysis is detailed in the Appendix IV A.
With the full linear mixed effects model given by Eq. (4),
we test the statistical significance of a fixed effect F . This
is accomplished by comparing the log-likelihood of the full
model with all fixed effects, to the log-likelihood of a re-
duced model with the effect of interest removed [46] (re-
gression coefficients associated with the effect are removed).
This comparison between the likelihood models is given by
Λ = 2(hfull − hreduced), where Λ is the likelihood ratio, hfull
is the log-likelihood of full model, and hreduced is the log-
likelihood of the model with the effect of interest removed.
Under the null hypothesis, when a fixed effect does not
have any influence on Cµ, i.e., the regression coefficients for
the effect are vanishing, the likelihood ratio Λ, is χ2 dis-
tributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in
the number of coefficients between the models. Therefore,
we consider any fixed effect in the set F to have a statisti-
cally significant effect on Cµ, if the probability of obtaining
the likelihood ratio given the relevant χ2 distribution is less
than 5% (p < 0.05). Thus, for each significant effect we re-
port the fixed effect being tested, i.e., an element of F , the
obtained likelihood ratio with its associated degrees of free-
dom (χ2(d.o.f.)), and the associated probability of obtaining
the statistic under the null hypothesis (p).
The LME and likelihood procedure are also repeated for
∆Cµ in order to find the significant interaction effects of the
parameters. Here, we also model ∆Cµ as dependent on λ
and c as in Eq. (4), but excluding the parameter ψ. Once
the significant effects of memory length, level of conscious
arousal, and channel location are characterised with our sta-
tistical analysis, we follow with post-hoc, one-sample two-
tailed t-tests given by
t =
〈∆Cµ〉f − µ0
sf/
√|f | , (5)
in order to examine the nature of interactions between λ and c
on ∆Cµ. We set µ0 to be the value of 〈∆Cµ〉f under the null
hypothesis (µ0 = 0), sf is the standard deviation of 〈∆Cµ〉f ,
and |f | = 13 is the sample size. We present the results of
these analyses in the following sections.
B. Results
In order to observe the effects of isoflurane on neural
complexity, we begin by visually inspecting the structure of
the reconstructed -machines for the two levels of conscious
arousal. We take special interest in observing the differences
Anaesthetised (0.6% isoflurane)Wakeful (0% isoflurane)
Figure 2. Colour map of statistical complexity response averaged
over (n = 13) flies 〈Cµ〉f , during wakefulness (left) and isoflurane
(right), over channel location and memory length λ. Hatched cells
on the right sub-figure, show regions where Cµ did not decrease
under anaesthesia.
in the characteristics of the two groups of -machines herald-
ing the two levels of conscious arousal. Here, memory length
λ plays an important role. At a given λ, the maximum num-
ber of causal states that may be generated scales according to
|A|λ [25]. In our case, the alphabet is binary, A = {0, 1}.
This greatly restricts the space of -machine configurations
available for short history lengths [47]. For λ = 2 we can
observe up to four distinct configurations, which is unlikely
to reveal the difference based on conscious states. Given the
previous findings [30], we generally expected that the data
from the wakeful state would present more complexity than
those from the anaesthetised state.
Visual inspection of the directed graphs indeed suggests
higher -machine complexity during the wakeful state com-
pared to the anaesthetised state, at a given set of parame-
ters {f, c, λ}. In particular, the data from the anaesthetised
state tended to result in a fewer number of causal states and
overall reduced graph connectivity. Panels (c) and (d) of
Fig. 1 are examples of -machines (channel 1 data recorded
from fly 1, at maximum memory length λ = 3), where a
simpler -machine is derived from the data under the anaes-
thetised condition. Differentiating between two conscious
arousal states by visual inspection quickly becomes imprac-
tical because of the large number of -machines. Moreover,
for large values of λ the number of causal states is exponen-
tially large and it becomes difficult to see the difference in
two graphs. To overcome these challenges, we look at the
statistical complexity Cµ to differentiate between conscious
arousal states. To systematically determine the relationships
between Cµ and the set of variables {c, f, ψ} we employ the
LME analysis outlined in Sec. III A. We first test whether λ
significantly affects Cµ. We found λ to indeed have a signif-
icant effect on Cµ (λ, χ2(1) = 443.64, p < 10−16). Fig. 2
shows that independent of the conscious arousal condition or
channel location, Cµ increases with larger λ. This indicates
that the Markov order of the neural data is much larger than
the largest memory length (λ = 11) we consider. Neverthe-
less, we have enough information to work with.
We now seek to confirm if the complexity of -machines
during anaesthesia are reduced, as suggested from visual in-
spection. Our statistical analysis indicates that Cµ is not
6invariably reduced during anaesthesia (ψ, χ2(1) = 0.212,
p = 0.645) at all levels of λ and all channel locations.
This means that Cµ cannot simply indicate the causal arousal
state without some additional information about time (λ) or
space (c). In addition, we find that neither c alone nor cψ
strongly effects Cµ. However, we find significant reduc-
tions in complexity when either the level of conscious arousal
or the channel location, interacts with memory length (λψ,
χ2(1) = 14.63, p = 1.31×10−4) and (cλ, χ2(14) = 42.876,
p = 8.97 × 10−5) respectively. Moreover, the three-way
interaction also has a strong effect (λψc, χ2(14) = 24.00,
p = 0.0458).
As the three-way interaction between λ, ψ, and c compli-
cates interpretation of their effects, we perform a second LME
analysis where we model ∆Cµ instead of Cµ, thus account-
ing for ψ implicitly. In doing so, we now investigate whether
the change in statistical complexity due to anaesthesia is af-
fected by memory length λ or channel location c. Using this
model, we find a non-significant effect of c on ∆Cµ, while
a significant effect of λ on ∆Cµ is seen (λ, χ2(1) = 20.97,
p = 4.65× 10−6), indicating that ∆Cµ overall changes with
λ. Specifically, ∆Cµ tends to increase with larger λ when
ignoring channel location, as is evident in Fig. 3. Further, ex-
plaining our previous interaction between λ and ψ, ∆Cµ was
not clearly larger than 0 for small memory length (λ = 2;
Fig. 3). This suggests that the information to differentiate be-
tween states of conscious arousal is contained in higher order
correlations.
We also find that the interaction between λ and channel lo-
cation has a significant effect on ∆Cµ (λc, χ2(14) = 37.19,
p = 6.90 × 10−4), indicating that the effect of λ is not con-
stant across channels. Given that ∆Cµ overall increases with
λ, we considered that that the largest ∆Cµ should occur at the
largest λ. Fig. 4 examines ∆Cµ across channels at λ = 11.
Here, we see varying ∆Cµ with channel location, which is
likely reflecting different rates at which ∆Cµ increases with
λ for each channel.
To further break down the interaction between λ and c,
we perform a one sample t-tests at each value of memory
length and channel location to find regions in the parame-
ter space (λ, c) where Cµ reliably differentiates wakefulness
from anaesthesia across flies. We plot the t-statistic at each
parameter combination in Fig. 5, outlining regions in the pa-
rameter space where ∆Cµ is significantly greater than 0 (with
p < 0.05, uncorrected, two-tailed). We find that the majority
of the significance map is directed towards positive values of
the t-statistic. However, only a subset of (λ, c) cells contain
values which are significantly different from 0. Interestingly,
we observe that for λ = 2, ∆Cµ is actually significantly nega-
tive, corresponding to greater complexity during anaesthesia,
not during wakefulness. This marks λ = 2 as anomalous rel-
ative to other levels of λ, and this reversal of the direction of
the effect of anaesthesia likely contributed to the interaction
between λ and ψ.
Disregarding λ = 2, we find ∆Cµ to be significantly
greater than 0 for channels 1, 3, 5 − 7, 9, 10, and 13, at vary-
ing levels of λ. As expected from our reported interaction be-
tween λ and c, we observe ∆Cµ to already be significantly
greater than 0 at small λ for channels 5 − 7, while ∆Cµ
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Figure 3. Difference in statistical complexity ∆Cµ = Cwakeµ −Canaesµ
of -machines between states of conscious arousal, increases with
memory length λ. Grey lines indicate complexity averages over
channels per fly (n = 13), 〈∆Cµ〉c, while the blue line denotes
the average over both channels and flies 〈∆Cµ〉c,f . Error bars are
95% confidence intervals of the population.
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Figure 4. Difference in statistical complexity ∆Cµ = Cwakeµ −Canaesµ
at maximum memory length λ = 11, mapped throughout the fly
brain. Grey and red lines indicate the result per fly and the average
over (n = 13) flies, 〈∆Cµ〉f , respectively. Error bars correspond-
ing to the 95% confidence intervals over the sample of files.
only becomes significantly greater at larger λ for channels
1, 3, 9, 10 and 13. Further, other channels such as the most
peripheral channel (c = 15) do not have ∆Cµ significantly
greater than 0 at any λ.
IV. DISCUSSION
Discovering a reliable measure of conscious arousal in an-
imals and humans remains one of the major outstanding chal-
lenges of neuroscience. The present study takes this chal-
lenge by connecting a complexity measure to the degree
of conscious arousal. Our study here is a step forward to
7Figure 5. Colour map for t-scores on statistical complexity differ-
ences 〈∆Cµ〉f = 〈Cwakeµ −Canaesµ 〉f over channel location and mem-
ory length λ. Dotted lines indicate the pixels that exceeded p < 0.05
(uncorrected).
strengthening the link between physics, complexity science,
and neuroscience. Here we have taken tools from the former
and have applied them to a problem in the latter. Namely,
we have studied the statistical complexity of neural record-
ings in the brains of flies over two states of conscious arousal:
awake and anaesthetised. We have demonstrated that differ-
ences between these macroscopic conditions can be revealed
by the statistical complexity of local electrical fluctuations in
various brain regions. Specifically, we analysed the single-
channel signals from electrodes embedded in the brain using
the -machine formalism, and quantified the statistical com-
plexity, Cµ, of the recorded data for 15 channels in 13 flies
over two states of conscious arousal. We found the statistical
complexity to be larger on average when a fly is awake than
when the same fly is anaesthetised (∆Cµ > 0; Figs. 3, 4,
and 5).
We found that the measured difference in complexity is
present across various brain regions (Fig. 5), even at the non-
trivial memory lengths (λ > 2), continuing to grow as longer
temporal correlations are taken into account, up to λ = 11
that we tested. While Fig. 3 showed a continued increase in
the difference of statistical complexity, ∆Cµ, as a function of
history length, λ, we did not pursue longer history lengths,
due to limitations in the amount of the data and stability of
the estimation of Cµ. In addition to this general observation
of increasing ∆Cµ over λ, we observed that some brain re-
gions surprisingly discriminate the conscious arousal states
with history length of only 3. One trivial explanation for this
effect is that under anaesthesia, the required memory length is
indeed λ = 2, while the optimal λ for awake is much larger.
However, a quick observation of Fig. 2 rules out this sim-
ple possibility; under both wakeful and anaesthetised states,
Cµ continues to increase. It is likely however, that the tested
range for λ remains below the Markov order of the neural
data; this is clearly indicated by the lack of a plateau in statis-
tical complexity in Fig. 3. This suggests that we are far from
saturating the Markov order of the process, and with more
data we would be able to further distinguish between the two
states. Future analyses with longer time series would also
contribute to our understanding of the Markov order (maxi-
mum memory length) differences between the two states of
conscious arousal
Nevertheless, our results, in Figs. 3 and 5, demonstrate that
saturation of Markov order is not required for discrimination
between conscious arousal states. This finding has a practical
implication about the empirical utility of -machines; even if
the history length is too low the inferred -machine and its
statistical complexity can be useful.
As we demonstrated in this study, the local information
contained within a single channel, may contain the infor-
mation about the global conscious states, that are believed
to arise from interactions among many neurons. Theoreti-
cally, single channels can reflect the complexity of the mul-
tiple channels due to the concept of Sugihara causality [48].
This arises due to any one region of the brain causally inter-
acting with the rest of the brain, making the temporal correla-
tion in a single channel time series contain information about
the spatial correlations, i.e., information that would be con-
tained in multiple channels. With this logic, Ref. [49] infers
the complexity of the multi-channel interactions from a sin-
gle channel temporal structure of the time series. This is often
known as the backflow of information in non-Markovian dy-
namics [50]. The surprising periodic structure of statistical
complexity observed across channels in Fig. 2, demonstrates
an unexpected example of spatial effects present in our study
– one that was not observed with conventional LFP analy-
ses. While the origin of this effect may be attributed to po-
larity reversals of LFPs across brain lobes, the ultimate cause
is unexplained for the moment. This observation provides
a strong motivation for multi-channel analyses, as it is clear
that causal history metrics revealing periodic spatial infor-
mation structures, hidden from LFP signal processing tech-
niques, may relate to information backflow. While we already
find differences between conscious states in the single chan-
nel based -machine analysis, it would be beneficial to extend
the present analysis to the multi-channel scenario, in which
-machine can be contrasted with the methods of IIT [9–18].
Formal comparison of the distinguishing power of conscious
states among proposed methods [6, 7], will contribute to re-
fine models and theories of consciousness.
Our results can be informally compared with a previous
study, where the power spectra of the same data in the fre-
quency domain [30] was analysed. Here, a principal obser-
vation was the power in low-frequency signals in central and
peripheral regions, which was more pronounced in the cen-
tral region (corresponding to channel 1-6 in this study). Our
-machine analysis here revealed that the region between pe-
riphery and centre (channels 5-7) showed most consistent dif-
ference in Cµ across history length λ > 2. Ultimately, the
reason for this difference is due to our distinct approach, in
so far as -machines are provably the optimal predictive mod-
els of a large class of time series that take into account higher
order correlations memory structure [20, 21]. Thus, our appli-
cation of -machines contrasts the power spectra analysis, by
considering these higher order correlations for the very high-
frequency signals, instead of only two-point correlations in
both high- and low-frequency signals.
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Figure 6. -machine for same channel, fly, conscious state as
Fig. 1(c), but with histories stored in each causal state explicitly
stated. The sequences after the asterisk ∗ represent the sequence
of symbol observations with the most recent observed symbol on
the far right. Sequences collected within a causal state (grey circle)
warrant significantly different future statistics to observed sequences
in other causal states. The red lines emit a “1" upon transition, and
blue lines emit “0"s.
Our multi-time analysis further reveals an interesting effect
upon expanding the details for the anaesthetised -machine
example shown in Fig. 1(c). When we examine the binary
strings belonging to each causal state, we find a clear split be-
tween active (consecutive strings of ones) and inactive (con-
secutive strings of zeros) neural behaviour corresponding to
the left and right hand sides of Fig. 6 respectively. Previ-
ous studies have demonstrated an increase in low-frequency
LFP and EEG power for mammals and birds during sleep and
anaesthesia, mediated by similar neural states of activity and
inactivity known as ‘up’ and ‘down’ states [51, 52]. This phe-
nomena remains to be observed in flies. While our study does
not directly observe this slow oscillation between neural ac-
tivity and quiescence, the active left and quiet right causal
state structure of Fig. 6 may suggest an analogue for the ‘up’
and ‘down’ states for flies in the absence of increased low-
frequency power. Future studies with more formal compar-
isons between power spectra and -machines in theory and
computer simulation may be a fruitful venue for further re-
search for this comparison.
Indeed, many definitions and measures of complexity have
been proposed in the literature, see Ref. [53] for a list. More-
over, there is a flow of ideas going the other way as well [54–
56]. Our interdisciplinary study opens up new possibili-
ties; physics can improve its theoretical constructs through
the application of tools to empirical data, while neuroscience
can benefit from rigorous quantitative tools that have proven
their physical basis across different spatio-temporal scales.
Among those complexity measures, Cµ can be easily inter-
preted in terms of temporal structure [57], as it has a direct
relation to process predictability and memory requirements.
One important property of Cµ is that it is zero for both de-
terministic and uniformly random processes, and it is maxi-
mum for stochastic processes with large memory effects (see
Eq. (2)). When coupled with our results, we can conclude that
anaesthetised brains become less structured and more ran-
dom, and approaches a stochastic process with smaller mem-
ory capacity compared to the wakeful brains.
Overall, our results suggest that measures of complexity,
including -machines, which have not been tested before in
this context, might be able to identify further structures that
are affected by anaesthesia at different spatial and tempo-
ral scales. It is also likely that applying a similar analysis
to other data sets, in particular, human EEG data will lead
to new discoveries regarding the relationship between con-
sciousness and complexity that can be retrieved simply at the
single channel level.
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APPENDIX
A. Linear mixed-effects model
The main goal of the LME analysis we perform in this
study is to determine the degree of contributions each and
combinations of memory length (λ), channel location (c),
and level of conscious arousal (ψ) have on statistical com-
plexity Cµ. LME accomplishes this by modelling statistical
complexity as a general linear regression equation (Eq. (4)),
whose response is predicted by the aforementioned param-
eters λ, c, and ψ. In this Appendix, we show the exact
form of the linear regression equation used in this analysis,
while referring to the terminology introduced in the methods
(Sec. III A).
We begin by restating Eq. (4), C = Fβ + Rb + E , which
has the form of a general multidimensional linear equation.
We will set aside the right hand side of the equality for now.
On the left hand side, statistical complexity takes the form
of a column vector C. Each row corresponds to the unique
response of Cµ, at a specific selection of parameters. There
is a general freedom of choice associated with the number of
parameters one would like to assign to the elements C. We
index the rows with fly number f , channel location c, and the
conscious arousal state ψ. That is, the (i, j, k)th element is
[C](i,j,k) = C(i,j,k)µ . (6)
In other words, it is the ith fly’s jth channel in kth condition.
Thus, C has length of |f | × |c| × |ψ| = 390. Each Cµ in this
vector is a function of λ.
The matrix F introducing the set of fixed effects F =
{λ, c, ψ, λc, λψ, cψ, λcψ} into the model (known in the con-
text of general linear models as the design matrix) can then
9be represented as F = (F1, . . . ,F13)T , with each element
corresponding to the design matrix of a specific fly. These
individual fly response matrices can be explicitly expressed
as
Ff =
(
~λ D ~ΨW λD λ~ΨW DΨW λDΨW
~λ D ~ΨA λD λ~ΨA DΨA λDΨA
)
, (7)
where ~λ = (λ, . . . , λ)T and ~ΨX = (ΨX , . . . ,ΨX)T are col-
umn vectors of length 15 containing the predictor variables of
memory length and level of conscious arousal respectively, D
is the 15× 15 identity matrix which “selects out" the channel
of interest, DΨX = diag(ΨX , . . . ,ΨX) is the 15× 15 matrix
which “selects out" the condition of interest correlated with
the level of conscious arousal, where
ΨW (A) =
{
1 if ψ = wakeful (anaesthetised)
0 otherwise.
(8)
In a similar fashion, the expression for the matrix contain-
ing the random effects R can be determined. For the case of
our study, we only consider random effects arising due to cor-
relations between channels within a specific fly. The result of
this is an adjustment to the intercept of the linear model for
each fly and channel combination. Therefore, the random ef-
fects matrix R is simply an identity matrix of dimension 390.
The accompanying elements of the random effects vector b
consist of regression coefficients bfc describing the strength
of each intercept adjustment.
The execution of the LME analysis which included coeffi-
cient fitting, and log-likelihood estimations was facilitated by
running fitlme.m in MATLAB R2108b.
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